Response of the Government of Sudan to the Report of the Special Rapporteur

Sudan's Statement to 54th Human Rights Commission 1998 (paras. 1-34)
INTRODUCTION 1. The Special Rapporteur (SR), Mr. Gaspar Biro, has submitted five reports to the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan since 1993. Also he has submitted one report to the Commission in 1992 in his capacity, at that time, as an Independent Expert. Furthermore, he has submitted five interim reports to the UN General Assembly. The Government of the Sudan, on its part, has responded to each of those reports. Likewise, this response is a reaction to his latest report submitted to the fifty-fourth session of the Commission and is intended to achieve the following objectives:- (a) respond to the unverified allegations and explain the recent positive developments which he has declined to mention. (b)counter his selective approach of concentrating on certain isolated incidents dating back to 1990 and 1992. (c)explain the open-door policy adopted by the Government which made it possible for many human rights activists to visit the country, and compare their reports with the report of the Special Rapporteur. (d)respond to his unwarranted conclusions and recommendations and his confrontational approach, and suggest alternative modalities for co-operation and working together with the Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Sudan. 2. A major misleading statement is made by the Special Rapporteur in paragraph (1) of his report where he has promised that certain paragraphs from the latest interim report will be reiterated in the present report when required to provide the reader with a better understanding of the context. 3. In the light of such promise one would expect that the SR would reiterate in the present report most of the paragraphs of the interim report pertaining to the human rights dimensions of the Peace Agreement of 21 April 1997, and the latest measures taken by the Government through the Advisory Council for Human Rights, since he himself has described those areas in paragraph (2) of the present report as the two objectives of his visit to the Sudan between 2 and 10 September 1997. Nevertheless, he has reiterated elaborately every negative aspect in the interim report and pushed to the corner those important areas where the Government has made tremendous achievements. 4. For example, no elaboration was made to paragraph (53) of the interim report where the Special Rapporteur has reported: 'In April 1997 the Advisory Council for Human Rights' established several sub-committees dealing with human rights violations and abuses ........ The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that this development should be considered by the international community as a positive step by the Government of the Sudan in addressing the situation of human rights in the country.' 5. Also no follow-up procedure was developed by the Special Rapporteur for the support of the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan, and recognised by the Special Rapporteur in his interim report of 1996 where he has requested the international community to do the following:- '(a) give priority to supporting the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan to investigate alleged human rights violations. (b) give priority to supporting the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan to improve the flow of information.' 6. The following was also pushed under the carpet: 'The provisions of the 21 April 1997 Khartoum Agreement on fundamental human rights and freedoms are in accordance with international standards on human rights....... The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that from a legal perspective the regulation of the institution of citizenship in accordance with the principles laid down in the April 1997 Khartoum Agreement and contained in constitutional decree No. 14/1997 is of crucial importance, inter alia, in giving effect to the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/59, in which the Commission called upon the Government of the Sudan to comply with applicable international human rights instruments and to bring its national legislation into accordance with those instruments to which the Sudan was a party, and to ensure that all individuals in its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including members of all religions and ethnic groups, enjoyed fully the rights recognised in those instruments.' 7. It is not true that in preparing the present report the Special Rapporteur undertook a mission to the Sudan,since he has not visited the Sudan since the last visit he has taken to the country between 2 and 10 September 1997, despite the fact that the Government has been ready to receive him at any time, and has actually received a delegation sent by the High Commissioner for Human Rights between 10 and 17 March 1998. 8. To conclude this introductory part, we believe that the Special Rapporteur, to look fair and objective, has included all the positive developments in the areas of peace and practical measures to investigate allegations and secure flow of information in the interim report submitted to the UN General Assembly, but he has devoted almost the whole of the present report to his contemplations and unverified allegations so as to justify the extension of his mandate, since it is the Commission which extends the mandate not the UN General Assembly. In fact, the Government has no objection for the extension of his mandate, but it strongly believes that such extension would not serve the promotion and protection of human rights in the Sudan. There is no point in producing the same report every year and adopting the same resolution which does not reflect the true facts on the ground. This process is a wasteful use of time and resources and would only serve the political objective of distorting the image of the Government. 9. Without exception, the reports of the Special Rapporteur are better summarised in one sentence found in all his previous reports and repeated now in paragraph (3): 'After the renewal of the mandate -----, the Special Rapporteur has continuously received until the date the present report was finalised ---detailed information on all categories of violations and human rights abuses he has addressed in previous reports.' After such sweeping statement he would give one or two examples of the testimonies he has received without discussing the weight of such testimonies. All clarifications made by the Government are not satisfactory and all investigations carried out by the Government are not convincing to him. 10. This kind of reporting could better be done from Geneva without committing time and resources. There is no in-depth analysis of the situation, no statistics, no objective criteria for measuring deterioration or improvement. 11. This present report proves beyond any doubt that it is a useless modality for judging the situation of human rights in the Sudan, nevertheless, the Government is maintaining its cooperation with the Special Rapporteur only because he is working under a mandate from the Commission on Human Rights. The Government would like to see his mandate terminated and the focus be given to technical assistance as explored by the delegation of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to the Sudan between 10 to 17 March 1997, and agreed to by the Government. 12. The Special Rapporteur has outlined his terms of reference in paragraph (4) and has chosen according to paragraph (5) to present some observations regarding certain aspects which in his view were ignored or addressed in an unsatisfactory manner by the Government. Therefore, we will respond, in the following paragraphs, to those aspects identified by the Special Rapporteur. I. Extrajudicial Killings and Summary Executions 13. First: It is to be noted from the very beginning that the phrase 'extrajudicial killings, and summary executions which has been repeated many times in each resolution and report about the situation of human rights in the Sudan since 1992, refers mainly to one single incident which has taken place more than five years in June and July of 1992 as has been rightly noted by the Special Rapporteur himself in paragraph (7). 14. Second: The incident itself was not a fighting between the army of the Government of the Sudan and the SPLA as the Special Rapporteur would like to see it, but it was an atrocious attack by the SPLA against the most densely populated town of Juba in Southern Sudan. The attack has been preceded by indiscriminate shelling and fifth column activities by Sudanese persons employed by foreign agencies located inside the town of Juba using the buildings and communication equipments of those agencies. 15. Third: After the attack was repelled, proper courts martial were held according to law, and the courts procedures have lasted for two months. Some of the accused persons were released and the charges against them were cancelled for lack of evidence, others were awarded minor imprisonment sentences, and few others were convicted of serious charges and were sentenced to death penalty according to applicable laws. 16. Fourth: Immediately after every thing has settled down, the Special Rapporteur has visited the country in his capacity, at that time, as an Independent Expert. He was given the opportunity to travel everywhere in the country and he could have investigated the incident in the manner he deems appropriate, but he has never done so. 17. Fifth: Later on, the Government has been requested, for no good reasons to investigate the incident, and it has done so committing time and resources. On 21 May 1997 it has, through the Advisory Council for Human Rights, released the results of the investigation. The records of the investigations were not made public for obvious reasons since they include classified information. 18. Sixth: The Special Rapporteur devoted 10 long paragraphs (6-15) criticising the report. However, the investigation Committee has said its final word and there is nothing much that the Government can do. 19. Seventh: The Special Rapporteur is very selective in quoting legal defenitions in paragraph (26) in connection with 'slavery', 'slave-trade' 'debt bondage' and 'serfdom', but he has never attempted to do the same in connection with other legal phrases like 'extrajudicial killings' and 'summary executions'. The reason is very simple, it is because he knows better than any body else that the findings, convictions and executions of the courts martial could not fit in the definition of 'extrajudicial killings and summary executions'. Nevertheless, those phrases have been quoted time and again to refer to those proper legal procedures. 20. Eighth: Despite the detailed, coverage of the Special Rapporteur of Juba incident for five consecutive years, he has never attempted to cover the following two aspects:- (a) the indiscriminate shelling of a densely populated area by SPLA where hundreds of civilians including women, children and elderly people have lost their lives, and where many schools, hospitals, churches, mosques and private homes have been levelled to the ground. The Special Rapporteur should hold SPLA and the fifth column elements responsible for such atrocities. (b) the legal implications for using certain buildings and equipments in helping the aggressors. 21. Finally, if there are actually extrajudicial killings and summary executions in the Sudan, the Special Rapporteur would not have confined his allegations to one single incident which has taken place more than five years ago within the context of an atrocious attack on civilian population. II. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 22. According to the mandate of the Special Rapporteur he is required to verify the allegations he receives. Usually, the verification of allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment would include the following:- (a) the names of the persons alleged to have been subjected to such mistreatment to know the number of the persons involved. (b) the kind of mistreatment to which each individual has been subjected. (c) an interview with each one of those individuals and the Government response for each case. (d) a comparison with the statistics of the previous years to come up with verified and well documented conclusions and recommendations. 23. Surprisingly, the Special Rapporteur has not followed any one step of that well established practice in dealing with the allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in paragraphs (16) and (17). He would start with a general and sweeping conclusion as he has done in paragraph (16): 'As in past years, torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees at the hands of security forces were reported continuously during 1997. The methods of torture reported were also similar to those practiced in the past years'. 24. Then, after having distorted the image of the Government by such unverified and general statement, he would jump and give one single and isolated incident in support of his sweeping statement as he has done in paragraph (17) where he has referred to: 'a written declaration given to the Special Rapporteur personally during his September visit by Ahmed Abdel Moneim Mohamed Attia (21), a student who graduated the Law Faculty of Nilein University of Khartoum'. 25. Even that written declaration itself was not verified, and it suffice to mention that there is no Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum called 'Neilein'. 26. It is unfortunate that after more than five years, the Special Rapporteur still believes that his duty is to report whatever he receives to the Commission without any verification. In fact if that is the case, it would have been more efficient and economic to post his mailing address, rather than take the trouble of sending him to the Sudan. III. Arbitrary Arrest and Lack of Due Process of Law 27. In paragraph (18) the Special Rapporteur has admitted that on 12 January 1997 the SPLA has attacked the border towns of Kurmuk and Geissan, and then he jumped to the point that hundreds of people were arrested by the security forces and declined to mention the following:- (a) where were those rebel forces before they have attacked the border towns of Kurmuk and Geissan. (b) what were the results of the attacks, bearing in mind that the Government of the Sudan has sent two investigation committees to the area, one committee from the judiciary and the other one from the Advisory Council for Human Rights. Their reports were handed over to the Special Rapporteur and he has acknowledged their receipt during the 53rd session of the Commission. Nevertheless, up to the date of writing this response, the SR has never mentioned any thing about those reports. And even when he has visited the Sudan in September 1997 he has never asked about the victims of the attack. 28. Also when reporting about arrest we notice the bias, since he would quote the number of persons arrested, but he would never tell how many of them have been released immediately after a very brief ordinary investigations. Moreover, he would push that positive aspect under the carpet as he has done in paragraph (18) by saying: 'some of whom were released'. It is important for the SR to quote the exact number of the persons arrested but not the number of the persons released. We are used to this kind of baised reporting from the SR but our main worry is that it misleads the international community. The fact of the case is that all the procedures were only preliminary investigations and only few persons were arrested. And even those few persons were immediately forwarded to the ordinary courts of law where most of them were released for lack of evidence and the rest were given minor sentences. 29. On the other hand, we note that the SR has visited the country in September 1997, nevertheless, he has not investigated those arrests which he has quoted from a report by Amnesty International dated April 1997. 30. In paragraph (19) the SR used the language which would entail more negative connotations: 'A further wave of arrests took place at least 33 individuals were arrested on charges of conspiracy'. He would never report about the outcome of the arrest, despite the fact that he has visited the country after those arrests have taken place. The fact of the case is that almost all of the persons arrested were released either during the preliminary investigations, or by the prosecutor's office where revision of the investigation is done, or by the courts for lack of evidence. 31. To make the picture look more gloomy and get support for his efforts to distort the image of the Government of the Sudan, he has recalled in paragraph (19) an isolated incident dating back to 1992 to the effect that Abu Bakr Rasikh was shot to death in October 1991 by a security officer on the street and the security officer was convicted for manslaughter. But he would not let the Government get credit for its efforts to apply the rule of law to its own security officers by saying: 'but reportedly he has spent only one month in detention'. Surprisingly, the SR has visited the country many times after that incident, but he has never investigated whether the security officer has spent the whole of the imprisonment sentence or only part of it. It seems that he understands that his role is to report the reports he receives not to verify those reports. 32. There is no doubt in our minds that there is no use in cooperating with the SR and that he is not in a position to do any thing to promote and protect human rights in the Sudan, but, nevertheless, we will maintain our cooperation with him for the obvious reasons already alluded to. However, if the Sudan is unfortunate and his mandate is renewed we can tell from now what will be written in his next report. It would be the same report of 1992 with some cosmotic changes. IV.Slavery, Servitude, Slave Trade, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices 33. In verifying the allegations about slavery and related practices, the Special Rapporteur, has made no effort other than maintaining his previous position, cite provisions from relevant international instruments, and then criticise the investigations carried out by the Government. 34. Undoubtedly, such kind of reporting does not deserve any response other than to recall the previous responses submitted by the Government. Nevertheless, we would like to draw the attention of the international community to the fact that the Government is serious and genuine in investigating all allegations of slavery and related practices. Therefore, soon after the SR has left the country in September 1997 without making any trip outside the city of Khartoum, the Sudan has received during 4-11 October 1997, Lord McNair of the British House of Lords to investigate those allegations by visiting many relevant locations. On 14 November 1997 Lord McNair released his report, but surprisingly the SR has never mentioned the report of Lord McNair. We do not want to make any speculations in that connection but would like to copy the following paragraphs from the report of Lord McNair for the sake of comparison:- (1) I have recently returned from a working visit to Sudan from 4 - 11 October 1997. This visit was the culmination of an examination of slavery allegations made against the government of Sudan and took me to the States of South and North Kordofan. (2) My overall impression was that there was something contrived about some of these reports which suggested to me the possibility of a deliberate campaign from some quarters to discredit the government. I spent one week in Sudan in September 1994 and visited Khartoum, Juba and Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan. My feeling that the Sudanese government was being unfairly portrayed was confirmed to a degree. (3) My initial scepticism about the accuracy of these allegations increased in the face of the earnest good intentions I had noticed in the government officials I had met in 1994. I was however, new to Africa and the Sudan and I decided to withhold judgement on this issue until I had a better understanding of the situation. I followed the allegations as they appeared until my most recent visit in October 1997. (4) As an integral part of this investigation I visited the States of Northern and Southern Kordofan, the site of many of the allegations. (5) We travelled first to El Obeid in North Kordofan and then to Dellinge and Kadugli in South Kordofan. We had a number of different meetings in locations in both States. Two themes emerged. Firstly, we could find no evidence of slavery. Secondly, the main concerns of the community leaders we met was for the hundreds, if not thousands of Nuba and Arab children who had been abducted by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces of John Garang. They appealed to us for help in having the children returned, and various ideas for achieving this were discussed. (6) Indeed, it would appear to me that the abduction by the SPLA of upwards of ten thousands mainly southern Sudanese children over the past decade or more is a far more tangible manifestation of slavery or slavery-like practices than anything alleged by Christian Solidarity International. As early as 1991, the American state department had reported the forcible conscription of 'at least 10'000 male minors'. The plight of these children has been well documented by Human Rights Watch/Africa, the Children's Rights Project and others. (7) It is well documented that the ICRC has for a number of years sought the release of these children. This has not been possible because of the intransigence of John Garang and the SPLA. (8) I have, as I mentioned, followed the issue of slavery allegations for some time. This visit, together with my other research, has led me to the conclusion that there is no slavery, certainly within North and South Kordofan which have been the focus of many of the allegations. Having reviewed the literature over the past three years, and having visited the areas in question on two occasions. (9) In the past, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the official United States government publication on human rights world-wide, has stated that any slavery-like practices that did exist were the result of the civil war in western Sudan, that they were concentrated in areas in which government administration was weak or non-existent, and that the arming of militias was a factor. In 1990, for example, the entry on Sudan stated that:- 'Slavery reported exists in those remote areas where government control is weak and where displaced persons fleeing the war zones come into contact with armed groups. The revival of slavery is often blamed on economic pressure and the civil war, especially the practice of arming tribal militias.' (10) I further note that Sudanese law is clear in unambiguously criminalising any of the practices, such as kidnapping, abduction, unlawful detention, forced labour and unlawful confinement, that could be construed as slavery, crime punishable by imprisonment. It is also noteworthy that in its 1992 official government publication, the Sudan Yearbook, the government stated that:- 'The issue of the slave trade...has been and will continue to be forever the most atrocious practice ever known in history.' (11) It is also clear, as a matter of record, that the Government of Sudan has from its earliest days in power been responsive to instances of abduction and kidnapping brought to its attention. Indeed, Anti-Slavery International clearly documents the fact that in November 1989 the Governor of Darfur, Abu al-Gasim Ibrahim, acted decisively when made aware of the concerns of Dinka communities that Rezeigat tribesmen had captured Dinka children in the course of inter-tribal fighting. These concerns had been brought to the attention of the government by a Dinka 'retrieval committee'. (12) The Governor of Darfur brought representatives of the Dinka community to his State guest house, and provided them with accommodation, while he organised an inter-tribal conference for the return of the children. (13) Anti-Slavery International also records that the Dinka community have brought cases of abduction to trial in al-Obeid. Leaders went to court in connection with a number of children abducted in 1987, during the administration of Sadiq-al-Mahdi. The court ordered the release of the children in question. (14) It is also of note that in its 1994 publication, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the war in Southern Sudan, Human Rights Watch/Africa cites a United States Department cable reporting that government authorities in Wau and Aweil had freed kidnapped women and children held by tribal militias. (15) I also note that in Human Rights Watch/Africa's 1996 study, Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan, for example, numerous further instances of direct Sudanese government intervention to secure the release of various numbers of illegally held people are recorded. Human Rights Watch/Africa stated, for example, that in 1995 government authorities in Aweil freed 500 captured women and children who had been taken prisoners during fighting between tribal militias. (16) Thus, the evidence clearly exists, as presented by reputable human rights organisations, that the present Sudanese government has, in its many components, intervened to free victims of inter-tribal raiding and violence - many of them illegally held since the days of the Sadiq al-Mahdi government. (17) In the light of this and other evidence, I find that there is no foundation for the allegations of slavery levelled at the government of Sudan, I also note that several international human rights organisations and activists have also found little evidence for such allegations. Alex de Waal, co-director of African Rights, for example, has stated:- 'there is no evidence for centrally-organised, government-directed slave raiding or slave trade'. (18) Anti-Slavery International has also stated that:- 'the charge that government troops engage in raids for the purpose of seizing slaves in not backed by the evidence'. (19) It is also recorded that the 1992 entry on Sudan in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices clearly states:- 'Sudanese law prohibits forced or compulsory labour and there was no evidence of organised or officially sanctioned slavery'. (20) It is my conclusion that what was true in 1992 as far as the United States Department of State was concerned holds true for Sudan at the time of my writing this report. (21) I am sad to place on record that the single most prominent vehicle for these allegations are substantiated. I must also place on record my deep concern at their sensationalist claims, and those of others they have brought to Sudan, to have 'bought slaves'. I am personally unconvinced that these people were 'slaves' in any accepted sense of the word. Both African Rights and Anti-Slavery International have also been critical of such claims on this issue. Alex de Waal, for example, has stated:- 'It is most probable that they were in fact paying a ransom to a go-between in a scheme whereby families pay, through a middleman, for their hostage children to be redeemed. They were not in a slave market'. I feel the interventions by CSI and its President Baroness Cox on this issue have been inflammatory and irresponsible. (22) The Baltimore Sun sent two journalists to investigate claims by Christian Solidarity International that slaves were available for purchase. It is clear to me, however, that the journalists from the Baltimore Sun were in no way 'buying slaves'. What they were taking part in was a corrupted example of the way some Sudanese families are forced to redeem children or other relatives who have been abducted in the course of the inter-tribal raiding and conflict that has spiralled in Sudan because of the continuing civil war. The man they paid money to for the two children was not a slave trader and the venue was not a slave market. (23) The claim that such coverage proves slavery is obviously false, it proves no such thing. What it does do, however, is fuel the propaganda and mythology that has blighted Sudan over the past few years. (24) The absurdity of this situation was manifested in the course of my fact-finding visit to North Kordofan. Our delegation visited the impressive Roman Catholic church in El-Obeid. We met and talked with Father Tombe, a widely-respected Sudanese Catholic priest. Father Tombe had previously spent several years in Kadugli building up a flourishing congregation and has also served as a priest in Darfur State. We asked him whether he had any evidence for the allegations of slavery. He said no, he had heard reports, and had read or heard about them in the media, presumably the international media. If the allegations had been true, his congregation, as Christians, would presumably have been the target of any such slaving activities. (25) In conclusion, I found that after several years of interest in this issue, which has included visits to Kordofan, the allegations of slavery made against the government of the Sudan are unfounded. It is additionally clear that there has been something of an international campaign to isolate Sudan by means of these allegations. I echo the several international human rights organisations which have condemned the inflammatory nature of these allegations and I question the motivation behind them.

Sudan's Statement to the 54th Human Rights Commission (para's 34-75)
V. The Freedom of Religion 35. In paragraphs (28) and (29) the Special Rapporteur has reported that the Government authorities have demolished four Catholic multipurpose centres in Khartoum State in December 1996, March 1997, April 1997 and July 1997. As usual he declined to report the whole story which is as follows:- (a) the demolition has also affected more than four Muslims multipurpose centres in those areas. (b)the demolition has been carried out within the context of urban planning according to law without any discrimination between Muslim Centres and Catholic Centres. (c)all the demolished centres (Muslim and Catholic) were poorly built of mud and straw without the approval of the local authorities. (d) better alternative locations in the neighbourhood have been offered. (e) prior notifications have been made in the daily newspapers and in the TV (see for example Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth daily newspaper issue No. 2588 and issue No. 2592). (f) during his visit to Khartoum in September 1997, the Government has given the Special Rapporteur the opportunity to visit one of the so-called Christian multipurpose Centres in Al-Hag Yousif area and to meet with the Christian community and their leaders. The Centre was nothing more than a small mud room which could fall at any time causing damage to life and property, nevertheless, the Government has decided to leave it as it is to evidence the fact that all allegations levelled in this connection are unfounded and that it is in the best interest of the Christian community to demolish such centres after providing better alternatives as the Government used to do. However, the SR has never mentioned his visit to that Christian centre. 36. In paragraph (30), the SR has referred to a Southern Sudanese Presbyterian Evangelist alleged to have been arrested because of his Christian faith. The SR has reported the case as received by himself without any attempt to verify it by requesting to meet the person concerned during his September 1997 visit to the Sudan. The Government policy in this connection is to maintain maximum transparency, and in substantiation of such contention we refer to the fact that the Government has received during January 1998 a parliamentary delegation from the Presbyterian Church of Belfast led by MP Martin Smith. The delegation has visited, during 6-7 January 1998, the Presbyterian Church in Juba and has come-up with the conclusion that the allegations levelled against the Government are unfounded. We believe that it is the duty and obligation of the Special Rapporteur to verify the reports he receives and not only to reiterate the contents of such reports in his report. In fact the reports of the Special Rapporteur are misleading to the international community since it would justifiably assume that whatever contained in those reports is verified, but unfortunately that is not the case. The reports of the Special Rapporteur are mostly nothing more than a compilation of the allegations levelled against the Government. 37. Not only that, but the Special Rapporteur would report certain positive measures undertaken by the Government without making any comment. For example, in paragraphs (32-34) he has rightly reported that the Government has responded on 14 August 1997 to the letter of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance dated 5 August 1997. As usual he did report the whole story to the effect that the letter of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance was addressed to all countries and that the Sudan was the first country to respond to that letter. However, we recall that the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance himself has appreciated the prompt response and cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in his presentation before the UN General Assembly in late 1997. 38. Such baised reporting would not help the promotion and protection of human rights in the Sudan, but it would only help those circles interested is distorting the image of the Sudan. VI. The Rights of the Child 39. Another serious issue which has occupied a sizeable part of the statement of the Special Rapporteur when presenting his interim report before the UN General Assembly in 1997 was the reference that he has for several years received reports on the abduction of children from Northern Uganda by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which is operating from areas located on both sides of the Sudan-Uganda border and that the reports were corroborated with UNICEF data. And as a result, the Special Rapporteur has called upon the Government of the Sudan to make unilateral efforts to bring to an end these abhorrent practices. In paragraph (35) the Special Rapporteur has gone beyond all limits to accuse the Government of the Sudan of supporting the LRA: 'There are well founded reports that the LRA receives support from the Government of Sudan'. We hold the Special Rapporteur fully responsible for this irresponsible and political statement and its implications. 40. The official position of the Government of the Sudan has been conveyed to the Special Rapporteur and we repeat it once again for convenience:- (a) The Government of the Sudan reiterates its consistent position of deploring violence, torture, abduction and any other inhumane treatments targeting children, and condemns in the strongest possible terms such cruel acts, whether they are perpetuated by LRA or by any other party. (b) On 21 March 1997, a high official of the United Nations communicated to the Government of the Sudan what was labelled as a 'Confidential Communication'. A list containing a number of names of girls was provided. The government of the Sudan was informed that these were Ugandan girls kidnapped by the LRA from a St. Mary's College in Uganda on 10 October 1996 and that they might be in the Sudan. The UN official stated that the information of the existence of these girls in the Sudan was not verified and the assistance of the Government of the Sudan has gone beyond the norms in responding to the humanitarian call. It has arranged for the Ugandan authorities, some European mediators and representatives of the nuns from St. Mary's College to visit all the areas under the control of the Government in Southern Sudan. The different delegations inspected all the areas where there is concentration of Ugandan refugees. The Government of the Sudan arranged for these delegations to talk and meet with the Heads of these Ugandan refugee camps. The aim of all these efforts was to collect any available information about the abducted girls. (c) The Sudanese and Ugandan Presidents have met and discussed this matter. They both expressed their concern about the Ugandan girls and declared their commitment to exert all possible efforts to finding and saving them. (d) The Sudanese rebels assisted by foreign troops control the areas adjacent to the Ugandan Northern borders and the nearest Sudan Government Forces inside the Sudanese territories in Southern Sudan is located at a distance of 100 kilometers from the Ugandan borders. The obvious conclusion is that the Government of the Sudan is not even in a position logistically to assist or support the LRA. However, even if it where, it would not do so, since the Sudan would never interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign States, particularly neighbouring countries. (e) The concern of the Sudan about the suffering of children affected by armed conflicts dates back to 1992. It became clear to the Sudan Government and the international community at the time that the rebel movement was abducting children from the various Sudanese villages to train them as soldiers, and use them as human shield or to keep them as ornaments to be used to obtain assistance and to gain the sympathy of the donors. The Sudan Government responded to this by presenting a draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly to condemn these actions and requested the Secretary-General to present a report on the matter. This resolution was adopted by consensus and has been presented annually since then. And it would have been more appropriate for the Special Rapporteur to raise this issue, rather than bringing an issue which has no connection with the Government of the Sudan and which the Government of the Sudan has already exerted utmost efforts to help the international community in resolving it. 41. We note that since the Special Rappporteur has assumed his mandate, the only issue he would raise in connection with the rights of the Child is the issue of street children. However, that issue has been handled by the Government to the satisfaction of the Special Rapporteur as he has admitted in paragraph (66) of his interim report to the UN General Assembly in 1997: 'it is especially encouraging that UNICEF is becoming more and more involved in common projects and field work with specialised departments of the Ministry of Social Planning, together with national and international NGOs. The Special Rapporteur believes that the international community should welcome these developments'. However, and as we have explained earlier, any positive developments recognised by the Special Rapporteur would only appear in the interim report and not in the final report before the Commission. And, since there is nothing negative about the rights of the child in the Sudan he brought the new serious accusation mentioned above making value judgement that there are well founded reports that LRA receives support from the Government of the Sudan. VII. The Rights of Women 42. Issues raised under this Part of the report have been dealt with in our response of last year dated 4 April 1997. 43. Regarding the Public Order Courts, referred to in paragraph (40), we would like to report that the Chief Justice has issued Circular 48/1998 dated 18 February 1998 whereby all the powers of Public Order Courts under Circular 478/1991 have been redeemed to Resident Magistrates. VIII. Improving the Flow of Information, the Independence Verification of Reports and Assessment of Possibility of Technical Assistance and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights 44. Unlike the Special Rapporteur, we are of the opinion that any cooperation in the field of technical assistance and advisory services should focus on building capacities at the national level for government and non-government entities. 45. In his interim report to the UN General Assembly in 1996, the Special Rapporteur has set the priorities for such technical assistance:- (a) give priority to supporting the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan to investigate alleged human rights violations. (b) give priority to supporting the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan to improve the flow of information. 46. In its resolution of April 1997 about the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the Commission has encouraged the Centre (OHCHR) to take into consideration requests for assistance by the Government of the Sudan. The same request has been included in the resolution of the UN General Assembly of November 1997 about the situation of human rights in the Sudan. 47. In fact technical assistance has been requested to the Sudan by the resolutions of the Commission on the situation of human rights in the Sudan since the early 1990s. 48. The Sudan has submitted many requests for technical assistance to the delegation from OHCHR which has visited the Sudan during 10 - 17 March 1997. And we believe that a positive response to such requests would improve the flow of information and communications. Since 1992 the Sudan has started to build its capacities in the field of human rights by establishing a comprehensive institutional framework. Thus, we have now the Advisory Council for Human Rights (ACHR) chaired by the Minister of Justice. Almost all government departments are represented in the ACHR. The ACHR is functioning through its Rapporteur, the Solicitor General for Public Law, and eight thematic sub-committees. At the States' level there are 26 Human Rights Education Committees reporting to the ACHR. Of late, the ACHR has maintained a regional presence by appointing a representative for the ACHR for the three States of Kordofan, because of the serious allegations of slavery in those States. Therefore, what is urgently needed is technical assistance to build the capacities of that comprehensive institutional framework. The development of this framework horizontally, through logistic support, and vertically through training, would guarantee better flow of information and better verification of reports. The protection and promotion of human rights through national institutions would be well received by the local community, and would create a conducive atmospher for better interaction with the international community. Opening an office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Khartoum would not service the purpose unless its mandate is clearly confined to the implementation and follow-up of the technical assistance provided. 49. Regarding the conflict zones, we believe that the best solution is to resolve the conflict peacefully, and the Government has gone all the way in that direction by signing the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 1997 and accepting the IGAD Declaration of Principles as basis for negotiations beside the Sudan Peace Agreement. And we believe that placement of human rights field officer would not service any purpose since the institutional framework mentioned above covers all the conflict zones. IX. Reprisal 50. After the occurrence of the single reprisal incident reported in paragraph (44) and which is dating back to September 1996, the Special Rapporteur has visited the Sudan in September 1997, but he has never investigated that isolated incident. Therefore, we submit that devoting a whole section of the report to a single case which the Special Rapporteur has failed to investigate while he was in the Sudan is another instance of his unfair reporting. Conclusions and Recommendations A. Conclusions 51. There is no point in reiterating the contents of the reports received by the Special Rapporteur, and it would have been more appropriate for him to verify such allegations. On the other hand, to draw general and sweeping conclusions and then site one or two cases in substantiation is not the proper way for carrying out the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. 52. The human rights violations including displacement of tens of thousands referred to in paragraph (47), which have taken place in January 1997 on the eastern border of the Sudan due to the armed aggression on the border towns of Kurmuk and Geissan, are the responsibility of the rebels as we have explained above. The role of the Government forces has been to repel the attack and defend the civilian population. 53. In his report, the Special Rapporteur has never mentioned any thing about aerial bombardments. Also during his visit to the Sudan, he has never verified these allegations, nevertheless, he has made a conclusion in paragraph (48) condemning the Government. Therefore, that conclusion should be disregarded. 54. We appreciate his reference in paragraph (49) that he considers the sub-committees established by the Advisory Council for Human Rights in April 1997 as a positive step taken by the Government in addressing the situation of human rights. But at the same time, we remind the Special Rapporteur that without the technical assistance requested by the Government, the Advisory Council and its sub-committee, would not be in a position to perform their functions properly, despite the fact that the budget of the Advisory Council is the only budget in the country which has enjoyed a regular annual increase since 1992. 55. Regarding the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 1997, we share the views of the Special Rapporteur that its provisions on fundamental human rights and freedoms are in accordance with international standards on human rights. Also we share his views that the regulation of the institution of citizenship in accordance with the principles laid down in the Agreement and contained in Constitutional Decree 14/1997 is of crucial importance in giving effect to the provisions of resolution 1997/59 adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan. 56. Regarding disappearances, the Special Rapporteur has declined to put the issue in its proper legal perspective as he has done with allegations of slavery and related practices. The fact of the case is that the Government has not enforced those persons to disappear, it is the SPLA that has attacked their villages and forced them to disappear in all directions to save their lives and property. And the Special Rapporteur has explicitly acknowledged that the Government Committee has 'made its best efforts to identify as many persons as possible from the initial list'. We confirm that the Sudan is a signatory party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and that it has taken all the necessary measures in order to assure that its combat units observe the principles and provisions of international humanitarian law. But we note that the reference made by the Special Rapporteur to such obligations is out of context, since it is well established that the Government combat units are not responsible for the disappearances and no one has claimed otherwise. On the other hand, we note that the SPLA, which is responsible for the disappearances, has never made any attempts to identify or investigate the cases of disappearances. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur has never held SPLA responsible. Therefore, we are fully justified in considering this issue closed as far as the Government is concerned, since the Government Committee has submitted its final report. 57. It is not true that in the past 8 years international human rights observers have been refused access by the Government to areas and locations under its control including Al Dein and Gogrial as claimed by the Special Rapporteur in paragraph (52). The Special Rapporteur himself has visited the Sudan many times during the past 8 years and he has never been refused access to those areas. In fact many international NGOs are still working in those areas. 58. On the issue of slavery and related practices our only request is to compare the findings of the Special Rapporteur in this connection with the findings of Lord McNair who has visited different locations in the Sudan in October 1997, after the Special Rapporteur has left the Sudan. It sufficies to mention that Lord McNair has concluded that all allegations of slavery and related practices are unfounded, after an on-site verification and revision of all reports made on the subject since 1980s, while the Special Rapporteur has only reiterated the contents of some unverified reports. 59. The Government is still deeply concerned about allegations of slavery and related practices, and consequently it has left the mandate of the Committee investigating those allegations open-ended. In order to support the work of the Committee, the Advisory Council for Human Rights has appointed a resident representative for the Council in the three States of West, North and South Kordofan, on 3 February 1998. 60. On various occasions, the Committee investigating allegations of slavery has reported in meetings held in Khartoum with the Special Rapporteur that it has done its best to implement the recommendations contained in his interim report of 1996. The Special Rapporteur should realise that the Committee is working voluntarily, it has no administrative staff and no secretariat services. It is working within the limited technical and financial resources of the Advisory Council for Human Rights. Therefore, the Committee requires, as a priority, technical assistance particularly training, office equipments, means of transportation and means of communications. It has submitted a request for technical assistance to the delegation of the OHCHR which has visited the Sudan during 10 - 17 March 1998. In fact the Government of the Sudan has been requesting technical assistance for all government and non-government entities working in the Sudan in the field of human rights. Such requests have been renewed and submitted in writing to the delegation and we hope that the Special Rapporteur would follow-up such requests. 61. The Government has allocated the maximum possible human and financial resources to its institutions working in the field of human rights as explained in paragraph (48) above. And it is the responsibility of the Special Rapporteur to request technical assistance for such institutions so as to build their capacities and thereby improve their performance. So far, the Special Rapporteur has referred to technical assistance lightly here and there, but he has never taken up that issue seriously with the OHCHR. We believe that it is an integral part of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur to take initiatives to help the government institutions working in the field of human rights to do a better job. 62. When the Special Rapporteur started his mandate in 1992 as an Independent Expert, there were reports of extrajudicial executions, torture, slavery, disappearances and other human rights violations, from United Nations and NGO sources. Now after more than five years the Special Rapporteur is referring to those same reports in paragraph (57) despite the fact that the circumstances have changed dramatically in different fields: transition to democracy, peace process, Government investigations of different allegations, adoption of an open-door policy which has enabled many human rights observers to visit the county, cancellation of the Public Orders Courts, freedom of expression, release of all detainees under the National Security Law, and many other unprecedented measures taken for the protection and promotion of human rights. The Special Rapporteur who is supposed to verify those reports is confining himself to a victious circle starting with the same reports in 1992 and ending with the same reports in 1998. It is really amazing that the Special Rapporteur would support his own report with the reports which he is supposed to verify. 63. Regarding the LRA issue, the Government maintains its position explained above, and holds the Special Rapporteur fully responsible for his unfounded claim that the Government assists LRA and for the political implications of such serious claim which goes beyond his mandate. 64. Regarding Juba report, we have nothing more to add to the results of the investigations published in May 1997, except the explanations already made to the effect that the whole report was not published because it includes numerous details of a classified nature. 65. We have no difficulty in agreeing with the conclusion of the Special Rapporteur in paragraph (61) that investigation of cases of disappearances needs more time and that cases resolved by the courts martial could have been communicated through an interim report, but at the same time we believe that it is the prerogative of the investigation Committee to decide on the modalities of its reporting. 66. The Government of the Sudan does not consider the Special Rapporteur and the OHCHR responsible for delaying the investigations, and the references made in that connection should be understood as explanations for the difficulties encountered by the investigation Committee. 67. We welcome the reference made by the Special Rapporteur in paragraph (63) to the effect that positive developments can be reported regarding the situation of street children in and around Khartoum, and that the international community should welcome these developments and support further steps aiming at improving the situation. And we hope that the Special Rapporteur would follow-up the request he has made to support such further steps. 68. Regarding the situation of women, we note that the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur in paragraphs (64) and (65) have focused on two issues: the recently adopted legislation at the level of Khartoum State on issues of public order, and the isolated incident of a demonstration by a group of approximately 50 women on 1 December 1997. 69. Regarding the issue of public order, we note that the issue is confined to one State (Khartoum) and it does not extend to the other 25 States. Moreover, and as we have already mentioned, the Chief Justice has issued Circular No. 48/1998 dated 18 February 1998 whereby the Public Order Courts have been cancelled and their powers redeemed to Resident Magistrates. 70. As for the demonstration, we clarify that it was an illegal demonstration and the intervention of the law enforcement officers was according to law. There is nothing peculiar about the legal procedures taken, and the sentences were reasonable and symbolic in nature, and were intended to avoid their detention in police custody. Regarding the facts of the case, there is no forced conscription in the PDF since the conscription in those forces is voluntarily. The Special Rapporteur has been to the country many times and he could have verified this aspect. The women have no children enlisted in the PDF or in any other regular force, and they are politically motivated to disturb the peace and give the mob the opportunity to widen the scale of disturbance. It is the duty and obligation of the Government to keep peace and order and protect life and property of each citizen against such unjustified actions.

Sudan's Statement to the 54th Human Rights Commission (para's 73-75)
B. Recommendations 71. The Special Rapporteur has considered as valid and should be reiterated the recommendations and calls upon the Government contained in resolution 59/1997 as quoted in paragraph (3) of his report. But since those calls have remained the same since 1992 despite the tremendous positive developments, we submit that they are lazy assumptions and should be disregarded. 72. In fact, most if not all recommendations of the Special Rapporteur are lazy assumptions which do not reflect the positive developments including those recognised by the Special Rapporteur himself on various occasions. Those developments include the following:- (1) The signature of the Sudan Peace Agreement of 21 April 1997, which, according to the words of the Special Rapporteur, is 'giving effect to the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/59, in which the Commission called upon the Government of the Sudan to comply with applicable international human rights instruments'. Also the Special Rapporteur has noted in his interim report that the provisions of that Agreement on fundamental human rights and freedoms 'are in accordance with international standards on human rights'. (2) The transition to constitutional legitimacy has progressed according to a very tight time table starting with the dissolution of the Revolutionary Command Council, followed by the appointment of the Transitional National Assembly, and then followed by the election of the present National Assembly and President of the Republic. And the transition would finally be concluded by June 1998 by the adoption of the constitution by a public referendum. (3) Fair distribution of power and wealth through the adoption of a federal system. (4) Full attention was given to the right to education and as a result the student population and number of universities and higher colleges have increased by more than 500 %. (5) Freedom of expression is widely enjoyed to the extent that the courts of law have cancelled an administrative decision terminating the licence of a daily newspaper. (6) Regarding street children, the Special Rapporteur has recognised the progress and called upon the international community to welcome the developments undertaken by the Government. (7) The Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance has noted, in his statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1997, that the Government of the Sudan is among the few governments which have responded promptly to his questions, and that the cooperation extended to him by the Government deserves appreciation. (8) The Special Rapporteur has also recognised the effective measures of a practical nature undertaken by the Government of the Sudan to investigate alleged human rights violations and to improve the flow of information. (9) The welcoming in resolution 1997/59 to the invitations extended by the Government to the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression and to the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. Moreover, invitations have also been extended to Amnesty International and the Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee at the British House of Lords. (10) The Sudan has also received a delegation from Human Rights Watch International, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance in 1996, a delegation of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights from 1 to 7 December 1996, a parliamentary delegation from Britain led by MP Martin Smith from 1 to 9 January 1998, and a delegation from the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights from 10 to 17 March 1998. In addition to many other human rights activists including the Lawyers Committee and the International Commission of Jurists. (11) The establishment of 26 National Committees for Human Rights Education. (12) The establishment of many thematic sub-committees to investigate all kinds of allegations, noting that they have been welcomed by the resolution of the UN General Assembly dated 20 November 1997. (13) The release of the all detainees under national security laws, and the cancellation by appleate courts of convictions and sentences of some of them rendered by first degree courts. For example, Advocate Gazi Sulieman and the Leader of prayers of Ansar mosque Sayed Abdel Mahmoud Abu. 73. Therefore, we believe that the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur contained in paragraphs (67-70) do not reflect the true situation on the ground and the tremendous developments which have taken place, in particular those referred to in the preceding paragraph. However, what should be recommended is the provision of technical assistance to build the capacity of the different government institutions established for the protection and promotion of human rights, in particular, the Advisory Council for Human Rights, its thematic sub-committees and the 26 Human Rights Education Committees. 74. The recommendations contained in paragraph (71) to the effect that a field office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights be established in Khartoum is accepted only to the extend that such office would have a single mandate of providing the technical assistance requested by the Government. The function of improving communication has been well taken care of by the subscription of the Advisory Council in the internet. 75. The recommendations contained in paragraph (72) in connection with the placement of human rights field officers in the conflict zones is unacceptable to the Government, since the government institutional framework working in the field of human rights covers Southern Sudan. Furthermore, peace is the only lasting solution to the problem.

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